INTRODUCTION
Since its novel inception in 1994, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), a labor side agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), has been the center of heated political debate.I Over the past decade, experts and proletarians alike have lined up on both sides of this debate armed with conjectures and experiential data that both
claim to bolster their support for and/or defiance of this truly innovative agreement. 3 Mirroring that debate should be a discussion of the NAALC's inclusion of migrant worker protection in its eleven core Labor Principles, and whether the NAALC has been both proficient and effective in actually protecting Mexican migrant workers in the United States. Protection of migrant workers' rights in the U.S. is an extremely important endeavor considering migrant workers make up an estimated threeand-one-half-percent of the U.S. labor force 4 and can be considered the "threads that hold together the tapestry we call North America." 5 Moreover,
with accounts of migrant workers in America "liv [ing] in poverty, [and] endur [ing] poor working conditions," we must look long and hard at the laws and regulations in the U.S. to see if they are of sufficient standing and are utilized to their maximum potential. 6 Since the NAALC was specifically created for protecting labor rights, and given the fact that it explicitly calls for the protection of migrant workers' rights, 7 the center of that focus should be on the dispute resolution mechanism espoused in the NAALC, itself. 8 As the NAALC may be becoming a model for new labor agreements, 9 and as the U.S. looks to regulate and conform to the continuing influx of migrant workers,' 0 now is the time to start the evaluation process yet again. Part I of this Note will briefly describe the history of the NAFTA within the political climate that existed at that time. This should then shed light on how the NAALC eventually came to fruition and why it so instrumental in changing the way we look at labor guidelines.
This Note will then discuss the intricacies of the NAALC's dispute resolution system and the process by which the three countries and their inhabitants can file a claim against another participating country. This initial understanding of the resolution process will prove crucial in determining its effectiveness as a whole, especially as it relates to protecting migrant workers particularly. To comprehend the full effect this process has on the Mexican migrant workers in the U.S., Part II of this Note will focus on who comprises the migrant workforce spilling from the border of Mexico into the U.S. and why these people seek work north of their native land. This insight will give a foundation for understanding the hardships the migrant workers face while in the U.S., which then opens the door for understanding why migrant workers need the protection of the NAALC in the first place. Then, Part 111 of this Note discusses the tribulations the migrant workers face by analyzing their quandaries through the lens of the U.S. laws and regulations formulated and required by the NAALC to protect them.
This groundwork permits Part IV of this Note to address whether the dispute resolution system has been effective in protecting the rights of Mexican migrant workers in the U.S. This will be accomplished through evaluating the submissions filed in Mexico against the U.S. for alleged failures to protect the Mexican migrant workers within its borders. Submissions filed in Canada (NAAEC). Both side provisions went into effect on January 1, 1994.
B. The Specifics of the NAALC and Its Dispute Resolution System
The NAALC was the first agreement of its kind and brought about changes prior agreements had yet to encompass. 24 For example, the NAALC is "the first international agreement on labor issues that has been coupled with a free trade agreement," and the oversight commission it established within it, is the first "international body since the creation of the International Labor Organization in 1919 to be dedicated solely to labor rights." 25 Furthermore, the 16. Bull, supra note 6, at 10. The two candidates vying for the 1992 presidency were incumbent, President George H. Bush, and his challenger, and eventual winner, President William Clinton. Id. NAALC extended to the International Labor Organization (ILO) by including "protections for migrant workers and workers' compensation." 26 The NAALC is also uniquely "non-invasive," because it does not affirmatively require that any of the three countries create or adopt any new laws regarding worker rights, nor does it mandate the commitment to any international standards. 27 Instead, it requires the three countries to enforce those laws already existing within each country.
CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
2 8 At the core of the NAALC, the agreement states all three countries agree to a common collaboration of seven objectives. 29 The countries must also "commit themselves" to the following eleven Labor Principles:
1. Freedom of association and protection of the right to organize; 2. The right to bargain collectively; 3. The right to strike; 4. Prohibition of forced labor; 5. Labor protections for children and young persons; 6. Minimum employment standards; 7. Elimination of employment discrimination; 8. Equal pay for women and men; 9. Prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses;
Compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses;
11. Protection of migrant workers. 3°T hese principles encompass five basic worker rights from the U.S.
trade laws, 3 1 six core ILO labor standards, 32 and two additional rights:
workers' compensation and migrant worker protection. 33 The principles are 
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The NAALC is governed by the Commission for Labor Cooperation (Commission), located in Washington, D.C., which consists of labor ministers from the U.S., Mexico, and Canada. 35 The three labor ministers also have a support staff called the Secretariat. 36 The Secretariat conducts "regular and special research reports on comparative labor law and labor market issues as well as serv [es] as the administrative arm of the Commission." 37 All members of the Secretariat are considered "international civil servants" who should not and cannot "take instruction from any government." 38 Significantly, a dispute can only be brought directly to the Commission when one of the countries disputes the lack of enforcement or the inappropriate application of another country's labor laws. 39 All other complaints, by either individuals or those who make up a group of people, must go through the National Administrative Office (NAO) 4 1 of the person or group's native country. 42 For all practical purposes, any "labor law matter" relating to one of the eleven Labor Principles can be grounds for a submission. 43 Concomitantly, throughout the history of the NAALC, many entities, such as trade unions, human rights organizations, labor lawyers for associations, and student groups, have filed submissions. 44 Once the complaint is received, each NAO of the affected country can meet with one another to confer and hold hearings on the matter in question. 45 If the NAO officials cannot come to an agreement, the labor ministers from the subsection A., infra. Id. 35. HR Concepts, supra note 17, at 141. The ministers get together once a year to discuss the Commission's work and the "implementation of the [a] At this stage, the distinction between the three groups of Labor Principles established under the NAALC agreement becomes important.
4 8 Up to this point, all three groups were entitled to NAO review and Ministerial Consultation; however, if the complaint has yet to be resolved by either stage, and if the complaint falls under Group I, the process ends. 49 For Group H, including the protection of migrant workers, and Group I, if the dispute is not settled, the MC can refer the matter on a "case-by-case basis" to the Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE). 50 The ECE is made up of an independent, 5 1 three-person team which "performs a comparative study" on the labor principal(s) specifically addressed by the MC. 52 The ECE may then conduct investigations of "alleged non-enforcement" and issue its proposal, which is then evaluated by the MC once more. 53 Although the recommendations are non-binding, they are publicly declared; consequently, it is possible pressure will be placed upon the affected government to act in accordance with its offerings. 54 Nonetheless, not one complaint out of the thirty-four filed has made it past the MC's review; therefore, speculating as to what the possible results is mere conjecture.
55
If the ECE is unable to resolve the issue, or if the MC is unwilling to follow its recommendation, all complaints under Group II principles are tabled, while complaints under Group IH principles progress to the final stage, which is a review by an Arbitral Panel (AP). 56 The AP is made up of five members who are on the MC's "roster" and has the authority to implement monetary fines 
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against a country that has failed to "enforce its own standards."
57
Sanctions may include trade sanctions on the "firm, industry, or sector" which is the cause of the submission in the first place. 58 The maximum penalty may be to suspend the NAFTA benefits up to "the amount of the monetary penalty (which may be no greater than NAFTA benefits from tariff reductions) for one year." 59 Importantly, only violations of the Group III principles, including minimum wage, child labor, and safety and health, can bring about sanctions, while the remaining eight Labor Principles are left without recourse. In the thirteen-plus years it has been in existence, no submissions have reached the AP stage. 61 As a result, little legal authority exists to compel the three countries to enforce their own standards; instead, the process is simply seen as a " [c] [Vol. 18:1 percent. 66 The population of Mexican workers in the U.S. has more than doubled in the past decade, and nearly forty-three percent of the future U.S. jobs will not require an advanced degree to fill, opening the door further for the availability of more work for Mexican migrant workers. 67 The actual breakdown of the jobs Mexican migrant workers are filling in the U.S. and the demographics of where the migrant workers domicile are important. Many owners and managers have consistently relied and will persistently lean on Mexican migrant labor in industries such as: "factories, restaurants, hotels, construction sites, hospitals, orchards, and innumerable other places of employment . . . . 68 With these industries struggling with continued worker shortages in America, 69 Thomas J. Donahue, a former President and C.E.O. of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, testified in 2001 before the U.S. Senate about U.S.-Mexico migration and queried, "[wlho will fill the millions of essential worker positions that we will create? Immigration must be one answer."
70
In fact, the U.S. Department of Labor found sixteen of the top thirty occupations in the U.S. with the highest projected job growth between years 2000-2010 will require only minimal education and "short-term, on-the-job training."
71 Although many of the migrant workers coming from Mexico have little to no formal education, they do have the requisite skills to satisfy these job vacancies in the U.S., as well as the ability to be trained; thus, making them perfectly suited to fit the needs the U.S. Department of Labor has determined exist and will subsist for quite some time. 72 Because of this continual need, nearly every American industry has seen a "dramatic increase in its reliance on 66 Remarkably, East South Central (Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee) experienced a 3,808% increase, while West North Central had the second highest total growth at 520%. The South Atlantic saw a 493% boost, while New England and the Middle Atlantic also saw increases in the mid-300% range. 80 In a purely numerical sense, the Pacific states, including California, had the highest augmentation of Mexican migrant workers, with 954,216 workers from years 1990 to 2000.
8 1 Texas, in the West South Central region, saw an increase of 510,000 Mexican workers during the same period.
82

C. Conditions Migrant Workers Face in the U.S.
Most of the immigrants coming to the U.S. from Mexico do so with little or no formal education and often with little comprehension of the English language.
8 3 A majority seek refuge in the U.S. [Vol. 18:1 RETHINKING NAFTA'S NAALC PROVISION often their children, and to save money for their futures." 4 As a result of these conditions, and due to financial, educational, and linguistic limitations, the workers are often subject to "egregious conditions" in the workplace, with little understanding of their rights while in the U.S. 85 Unfortunately, wide spread reports indicate labor is being trafficked into the U.S., with workers being "deceived about the conditions of their [future] employment," only to be placed into programs of forced labor and servitude while in the U.S. 86 In those environments, the workers often make less than the U.S. minimum wage, work over nineteen hours a day, are subject to psychological and physical abuse, and are refused permission to speak to or come in contact with people outside their work environment. 87 As it relates to farming and the agricultural community in the U.S., "[m]ost migrant farmworkers... 'live in poverty, [and] endure poor working conditions[,]' 88 with some conditions described as "sweatshops in the fields." 89 In fact, the average migrant farm worker in the U.S. makes around $7,500 per year, well below the U.S. poverty level. 90 These conditions led Cesar Chavez 9 1 to state, "[i]t is ironic that those who till the soil, cultivate and harvest the fruits, vegetables, and other foods that fill your tables with abundance have nothing left for themselves."
92
While not every migrant worker who enters the U.S. from Mexico suffers from such poverty, it exists on a large enough scale it must be considered when evaluating whether migrant workers are truly protected.
93
Given the NAALC is intended as a means to voice concerns regarding the treatment of migrant workers, it is important to evaluate both the positive and 
A. How Does One Become a Mexican Migrant Worker in the U.S?
A large number of Mexican migrant workers come into the U.S. by one of three legal ways: (1) the family reunification system, (2) an employmentbased visa system, and/or (3) through some sort of temporary worker visa program. 95 The family reunification system allows immigrant workers within the U.S. to sponsor relatives in their native country, with hopes those relatives may eventually come to the U.S. as legally admitted immigrants. 96 Some of the larger employment-based visa system classifications include: on-campus employment as a student, 9 7 off-campus employment due to severe economic hardship, 9 8 extraordinary aliens, 99 religious workers, 1°° and NAFTA
professionals.
Under a temporary worker program, Mexican migrant workers can enter the U.S. through numerous legal avenues.
10 2 A few workers gain visas as H-1A nurses, H-1B aliens in specialty occupations, while many also obtain visas as H-2A temporary agricultural service workers, H-2B other S 103 workers, or a H-3 temporary trainees.
Despite the numerous avenues existing for Mexican immigrants to enter the U.S. legally, a great number of Mexican migrant workers enter the U.S. Mexican immigrants were living in the U.S., the vast majority of whom had sought some type of employment. 15 For many Mexican immigrants, the choice of illegal entry may be attributed to the low probability they have of being allowed into the U.S. legally for employment reasons when compared to the success rate of admittance for immigrants seeking work from other countries. 10 6 In 1999, only 29.3% of the Mexicans admitted to the U.S. received employment visas, while immigrants from other countries averaged around 45.3% percent.
107
Adding to the pressure to enter illegally, most migrant workers face long lines and even longer waiting periods to gain admittance into the U.S. legally. Moreover, in 1998, 43.5% percent of the Mexican migrant employment-based visas issued were for H-2A temporary agricultural jobs. 11 Therefore, if a Mexican migrant worker wishes to work in an American industry other than agriculture, his or her chances of gaining the legal, temporary visa he or she desires is both statistically unlikely and temporally burdensome. The NAFTA was enacted, partially and purposefully, to help ebb the flow of illegal immigrants from Mexico who are in search of work inside the U.S. 112 In 1986, prior to the NAFTA, the Immigration and Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was established in hopes of obtaining the same goal.
113
The IRCA had two primary functions: (1) to make the hiring of illegal aliens grounds for both fines and/or imprisonment against employers, and (2) to "provide[] amnesty to illegal aliens who... lived in the U.S. continually since 1982, if they applied before 1988." ' l 1 4 Despite similar goals, the NAFTA and NAALC have been at odds with one another since their creation. 115 Because amnesty was granted to so many by IRCA, future generations have been rushing to the U.S. borders, hoping similar amnesty deals may be on the horizon, while employers sit willing to employ them, despite the threat of hefty fines and possible imprisonment.116
These elements help explain, but are by no means all-encompassing, Once more, the NAALC requires the U.S., Mexico, and Canada to enforce the laws each respective country has in place for the protection of workers' rights, whether native or foreign-bom."1 9 Accordingly, it is important for the analysis of this Note to look at a few, significant laws established for the defense of workers rights in the U.S.
In general, workers in the U.S., whether documented or undocumented,12 0 have many of the same rights that other workers around the world enjoy.'
12
Those rights include, but are not limited to: "the right to form and join unions, the right to compensation if injured on the job, the right to a safe workplace, the right to be free from forced labor, and the right to be free from discrimination in the workplace."' ' 22 Within those confines, migrant workers can file complaints for alleged violations in several ways: (1) with the different local or federal agencies charged with upholding the specific law(s) in question, 1 (2) with "legal aid" offices' assistance for low-income immigrants, 124 and/or (3) with the 117. "Undocumented workers" is a classification label for those workers who have not gained valid working permits and have not registered with the U.S. government in order to legally obtain work as a foreign born worker. See generally GUIDE, supra note 5, at Guide to Labor Relations Law in the United States. Most U.S. laws and regulations treat the documented and undocumented workers the same. Id. "However, certain remedies for unfair labor practices, such as reinstatement or back pay for work not performed" are available to documented workers, but are not extended to undocumented workers under the National Labor Relations Act. The U.S. has specifically enumerated protections for labor relations rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) as well. These include the right to:
1. Form, join or assist labor organizations to organize the employees of an employer; 2. Bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing; 3. Engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, typically to modify wages or working conditions; 4. Strike to secure better working conditions; 5. Refrain from union activity.
126
Under the NLRA, a worker must be classified as an "employee" before they can receive protection.1 27 Several workers do not receive protection under the NLRA by definition, including agricultural workers, domestic workers, managers, supervisors, confidential employees, independent employees, and employees covered by the Railway Labor Act. 128 The NLRA typically covers foreign workers, which include documented or undocumented migrant workers; however, undocumented workers may not seek the remedies of reinstatement and back pay for work not performed. 129 It is important to note farm workers, who make up an average of 43.5% of those who gain visas to work in the U.S., are not included in the protection of the NLRA.
30
The NLRA does protect against several unfair labor practices: (1) employer threats of termination of employment if the workers joins a union, (2) questioning workers of their "sympathies or activities in circumstances that tend to interfere with ... their rights ... " (3) discouraging union support by offering rewards for non-involvement, and (4) "[tlransferring, laying off, terminating or assigning" workers more difficult jobs because of their chosen enrollment in union activities.' 3 '
The U.S. also protects migrant workers from forced labor under 
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employer threatening physical harm on its employees if they leave the job, (2) an employer threatening to destroy passports or immigration papers, (3) an employer attempting to keep his/her employee from traveling, (4) a "coyote' 133 requiring the workers to work for free as payment for smuggling them into the country, (5) an employer requiring workers to work to pay off their debt, and (6) employers forcing workers to partake in prostitution. 1 34 While in the U.S., migrant workers are also entitled to certain minimum employment standards, which include "minimum wages, overtime pay, legal wage deductions, unemployment compensation, and time off from work for family and medical leave."' 35 Curiously, farm workers do not have the right to receive overtime pay, while undocumented non-farming related workers do. 136 Additionally, the Family Medical Leave Act allows all employees, both documented and undocumented, to take off work for the birth or adoption of a child; to care for a child, spouse or parent; and/or to accommodate the employee's serious health complications.' 37 Mexican migrant workers are also entitled to protection from employment discrimination due to "race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, or disability."' 38 This safeguard affords workers freedom from being fired, paid less or receiving fewer benefits, and/or receiving sexual harassment because of their race, color, nationality, etc. 1 39 All workers, even those absent an official work permit, are also assured a healthy and safe workplace. 140 This pledge is governed by the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act), overseen by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which requires employers to: (1) maintain OSH standards, (2) inform employees of those standards, (3) retain safety equipment and tools, (4) provide training and medical exams when necessary, (5) report to OSHA when mandated, and (6) post and provide remedies for citations issued by OSHA.
14 1 A few programs are also designed to further In most cases, the U.S. allows workers to be compensated if and when they are injured while on the job. 47 In general, most workers are entitled to workers' compensation benefits1 48 if they are hurt on the job, and employers are not allowed to "retaliate" against any worker for filing a workman's compensation claim. 1 49 Foreign workers, including those with H-2A visas, are entitled to workers' compensation, regardless of whether they are documented; however, farm workers are not entitled to workers' compensation in every state. 50 Interestingly, employees may not sue their employer over workers' compensation; instead, employees may merely file a workers' compensation claim and/ appeal it if all administrative remedies are denied.' 5 '
Despite the aforementioned protections guaranteed to migrant workers under the U.S. laws, the NAALC process has yet to remedy a single alleged violation of those laws over the past thirteen years.
IV. SUBMISSIONS FILED BY MEXICO AS AGAINST THE U.S. AND A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT CANADA'S SUBMISSIONS AGAINST THE U.S.
To appreciate the breadth of where most of the filings originate, it is essential to step back and view the entire status of submissions under the NAALC. As of July, 2006,152 thirty-four submissions had been filed under the auspices of the NAALC. 53 Of the twenty-one submissions filed by the U.S., 
A. A Quick Look at the Mexican Submissions Filed Against the U.S.
On February 9, 1995, the Mexican Telephone Workers Union filed Mexico NAO Submission 9501 (SPRINT) concerning a subsidiary of the Sprint Corporation which had been purposefully closed just before a vote for union election consolidation was to occur. 1 57 While the NLRB originally ruled in favor of the workers, on December 27, 1996, a U.S. Appeals Court overturned its decree.' 58 Nonetheless, a ministerial consultation was requested to discuss the "effects of such a plant closure on union organizing efforts.'
159
The U.S. Secretary of Labor and the Mexican Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare held a public forum in California to "allow interested persons an opportunity to convey their concerns about the effects of sudden plant closings."' 6° In June of 1997, the tri-national Labor Secretariat also conducted a study on effect of sudden plant closings on the freedom of association and workers' rights to organize; however, the plant was never re-opened and the workers never regained their lost jobs. 161 On April 13, 1998, the Local 1-675 of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union (OCAW), along with the "October 6" Industrial and Commercial Workers Union, the Labor Community Defense Union (UDLC), and the Support Committee for Maquiladora Workers (SCMW), filed Mexico NAO Submission No. 9801 (SOLEC). 162 The submission claimed Solec, Inc. and the U.S. despoiled their: (1) freedom of association, (2) right to organize, (3) right to bargain collectively, (4) assured federal minimum wage requirement, (5) guaranteed employment standards, and (6) The third submission filed in the NAO of Mexico came from a group of migrant workers in the State of Washington's apple industry. 6 6 Mexico NAO Submission No. 9802 raised issues of "freedom of association, safety and health, employment discrimination, minimum employment standards, protection of migrant workers, and compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses." 67 This was the first submission to specifically speak of a failure to explicitly protect migrant workers,1 6 8 as guaranteed in the objectives of the NAALC provision. 69 The migrant workers claimed they were not receiving equal treatment under U.S. law as compared to domestic workers because migrant workers were receiving less than minimum employment standards and were refused their explicit right to organize a union.
70
The migrant workers claimed they were receiving unequal protection in "a) rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining, b) the compensation system, c) the H-2A foreign agricultural workers program, and d) housing."' 7 ' As to the infringement upon their freedom of association and collective bargaining rights, the migrant workers claimed they were being turned into the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) each time they tried to structure a union. 72 Furthermore, the migrant workers asserted they received less compensation in seventeen states, and, in the State of Washington, migrant workers received fifty percent fewer benefits than domestic workers for the death of a family member on the job. 73 
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the H-2A program provided unequal protection because it excluded workers from the Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA), and they were thus unprotected against poor "work conditions and wages, records of agricultural work contractors and minimum transportation, safety and housing standards."'
74
The Mexican NAO recommended ministerial consultations regarding all of the aforementioned issues raised by the migrant workers in the apple industry.
175
Again, Mexican NAO Submission 9802 was coupled alongside 9801 and 9803 for final review purposes. 1 76 The Mexican Confederation of Labor (CTM) submitted Mexico NAO Submission No. 9803 (DECOSTER EGG) in August of 1998.177 Among the issues voiced were a lack of freedom of association, protection of migrant workers' rights, employment discrimination, safety and health, and workers' compensation.
178
More particularly, the migrant workers brought forth information the U.S. "ha[d] not provided them and w[as] not providing them with any guarantee of enforcement of the U.S. laws designed to protect them."179 "They point out that 'Mexican workers have never received the legal protection they need to ensure that they are not hired by deceitful means. ' "0
80
To further this contention, the migrant workers described being "required to pay for transportation and housing when they had originally been told that such costs would be covered."'
181
Migrant workers also alleged they had been injured on the job with no notification of what their workers' compensation rights may be, and were given no notice of the benefits afforded under U.S. employment law; furthermore, their injuries were not properly documented.
182
After reviewing the assertions, the Mexican NAO suggested ministerial counsel to determine whether the migrant workers were enjoying the same privileges guaranteed under U.S. law as domestic workers. 183 2002.186 In June of 2002, a public forum was held and "[g]overnment officials, employer representatives, educators, legal counselors, advocates and other service providers" gathered to discuss all of the issues raised in the three submissions previously delineated and the need to protect Mexican migrant workers in the U.S. i 8 7 Most importantly, at both public forums, the three countries began to devise a tri-national guide, which has since been completed, so migrant workers would know their rights while in the U.S.; however, no specific allegations in the three submissions were explicitly remedied. The petitioners alleged the judges for the New York workers' compensation administration were complicating the process by failing to follow formal rules and procedures, which delayed processing claims from four to twenty years. 1 97 In The submission raised concerns about the H-2A program in North Carolina, which involved the farm workers' rights to minimum employment standards, to strike, to freedom of association, against employment discrimination, to safeguards for occupational injuries/standards, and for the protection of migrant workers' rights. 2° ' The Mexican NAO has yet to "issue a report of review on the ,,202
submission. Nevertheless, the U.S. Department of Labor and Mexico's Foreign Relations Secretariat took initiative to sign two Letters of Agreement and a Joint Declaration promoting further protection of Mexican migrant workers' rights. 2°3 Currently, the U.S. Department of Labor and local Mexican consulates in North Carolina are evaluating the issues and laws addressed in this submission and hope to address them "fully and satisfactorily;" however, to date, nothing particular has been done. 2 The submission claims violations under the H-2B visa program in Idaho involving forced labor, failure to enforce minimum employment standards, employment discrimination, equal pay for the sexes, occupational injuries, lack of compensation, and a failure to protect migrant workers.
2 0 6 As of this writing, no reviews have been summoned for this submission, nor have there been calls for ministerial consultation. The submission further claimed this resulted in a "failure to provide for high labor standards, and to apply effectively and enforce laws relating to freedom of association and the right to organize unions. 215 Nevertheless, the Canadian NAO wrote a letter to the petitioners informing them the matter would not be reviewed because the information offered by the U.S. NAO, AFL-CIO, and petitioners failed to proffer evidence of non-compliance with the enumerated obligations in the NAALC. 216 Despite the request for reconsideration, the Canadian NAO refused to resurrect the issue.
217
Canada and Mexico have both filed ten submissions in total against the U.S., none of which have gone beyond the ministerial consultation stage.
8
Mexico has had five submissions against the U.S. reach the ministerial consultation level, while Canada has failed to have a single complaint against the U.S. reach that fundamental stage. 219 As MC has been the highest level any submission has ever reached, 220 it is fascinating to see which of the three countries most utilized it in the evaluation process. Interestingly, Canada's NAO has been the strictest in using ministerial review, exemplified by only twenty percent of submissions reaching ministerial review (one of five filed), while the U.S. had slightly over thirty-eight percent (eight of twenty-one) and Mexico had 62.5% (five of eight) of their respective cases reaching the highest level of review thus far. 
NAALC AND ITS DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM
A. The Strengths of the NAALC and Its Dispute Resolution System
The NAALC was, incontrovertibly, the first in a host of free trade agreements to break ground and pioneer an accord specifically addressing labor protection. 223 In so doing, the agreement single-handedly initiated the support and encouragement for the "[e]nforcement of labor laws in the NAALC countries.
Similarly, the NAFTA and NAALC are important because they have strengthened the bonds between the three conjoined nations, which, in due course, has helped to "open doors and break down barriers" previously serving as impediments. 225 Some have attributed this to the NAALC's "non-invasive" approach to advancing autonomy for each individual country to impose its own labor laws without pressure from the other two countries demanding enforcement of their own regulations. 226 Consequently, it could be argued sovereignty has brought forth trilateral communication which need not be strained by outside political pressure and governmental interference from the other countries. 227 As trade relationships among the three countries continued to grow stronger, new lines of communication and dialogue opened. 228 Because the agreement mandates governmental agencies to communicate through the NAO office of each respective country, an increase in "cross border networking" between unions and community groups has also occurred.
229
Before the NAALC was signed, "information comparing laws and labor market indicators among the three countries was not always readily available [,] " however, the agreement has since generated "studies comparing the labor laws of the three countries, nurtured the development of a standardized system of labor market indicators, and been responsible for studies comparing productivity levels and wages., 230 These newly spawned studies, seminars, and reports have brought forth awareness in the media to the many issues workers in Mexico face and the need for further protection of immigrant workers inside the borders of the u.s. The addition of media scrutiny has been collectively referred to as "The Sunshine Effect. ' , 232 Basically, with the advent of the NAALC, individual workers, unions, and other groups are able to use the different media outlets as spotlights on the issues they were facing. 233 Though workers were initially suspicious and believed no "real concrete resolutions" would result from their submissions under the NAALC, workers also knew they could bring attention to their problems because the process was tri-nationally supported and formalized. 234 For example, in Mexico, the NAALC and the publicity it has spawned increased the occupational safety and health of workers in Mexico by reducing the number of injuries reported and illnesses claimed by thirty percent in its first three years. 235 Specifically, the NAALC has been beneficial to Mexico by providing "greater awareness of occupational health and safety issues in some Mexican workplaces, broader knowledge of government regulations and enforcement procedures among some Mexican workers, and unprecedented cross-border solidarity and joint activities between workers, unions, women's groups, environmentalists and occupational health professionals. 236 However, it is alleged the great successes Mexico has seen may have come from the publicity created by the workers themselves, rather than the combined efforts of the Mexican government, Labor Departments, and the NAALC's respective NAO offices. 237 Many proponents of the agreement indicate public awareness and input have helped aid and facilitate over fifty trilateral programs that have subsequently been fostered as a result.
238
In addition, after ministerial consultations were held for Mexico NAO Submissions 9801, 9802, and 9803, because of the public awareness and the inclusion of communal input during those public forums, a tri-national guide was created to insure that future migrant workers would know exactly what their guaranteed rights are within foreign borders. 239 The three countries have also formed cooperative efforts on employment standards, industrial relations, occupational safety and health, employment training, child labor, and workers' rights. 24° Finally, all three countries have provided numerous training sessions, onsite visits to workplaces, and public symposiums to better inform the public of the "best practices" available to further assist workers' rights. 24 1 At the bare minimum, the NAALC and its resulting media interest have played a critical role in shedding light on the shortcomings of labor protection 
B. The Weaknesses of the NAALC and Its Dispute Resolution System
Over the past thirteen years, many critics have placed their criticism of the NAALC in one of three categories: (1) it has failed to live up to the original plan; (2) it sounds "alarm[s]" and raises red flags; (3) while others claim it has 243 become completely archaic.
An overarching concern for all those who oppose the provision is its failure to go to the lengths needed to provide adequate protection for all workers. 2 "
One of the most apparent red flags raised is that not a single complaint brought under the NAALC dispute resolution system has led to a fine, sanction, or moved beyond the ministerial consultation stage. 245 A few government and legal professionals have theorized a fear to take submissions to the ECE, one step beyond the ministerial review, exists because an independent body evaluates the submission, thus taking it out of the negotiating hands of the three 246 countries.
Another theory behind this fear may be the possibility that those in power in these three countries may be forced to accept the awkward truth their respective governments have failed and are culpable for their own 247 shortcomings.
In fact, all three countries are evaluated during this process, not just the country alleged to have failed to enforce the provisions of the NAALC; therefore, all three can be subject to recourse.
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Even more, not one illegally terminated worker, including Mexican migrant workers, has been reinstated; not one independent union has been bargained for and/or created; and, finally, not a single occupational safety or health violation has been remedied.7 49 Despite the focus of this Note being on migrant workers specifically, it appears as if most of the shortcomings of the agreement actually apply equally to all the Labor Principles. 2 0 Though "reports, seminars, conferences, websites, and outreach sessions" have been generated in this regard, it is easy to see why many feel the enforcement mechanism of the NAALC falls short of remedying the very things sought, including the much desired and illusive sanctions.
In Perhaps the most tragic aspect of all is the failure to protect migrant workers in the U.S., and specifically migrant farm workers from Mexico. As an example, in 1999 Mexican farm workers with an H-2A visa made up an estimated 43.5% of Mexican migrant workers in the U.S. 2 7 Yet, while reports of forced labor and servitude still exist, and while conditions resembling sweatshops are prevalent, it is hard to claim the NAALC has been a complete success in furthering their protection. 28 8 Quite the opposite seems true.
Considering some workers fear physical abuse if they report their problems, it is hard to evaluate how the NAALC can help, given the fact that the process is already very lengthy, too costly, and has underscored concerns Mexican migrant workers have been handed over to the Immigration and Naturalization Services purely for voicing their concerns. 289 As Cesar Chavez so eloquently stated, "[o]ur struggle is not easy. Those that oppose our cause are rich and powerful, and they have many allies in high places. We are poor. Our allies are few. '29°C havez was attempting to demonstrate migrant workers rely on patronage from their guaranteed right of freedom of association because they do not have the financial means nor do they possess a powerful enough political voice. 29 ' Nevertheless, no matter how fundamental freedom of association may be to gaining the protection the migrant workers need, freedom of association cannot bring about sanctions under the existing dispute resolution system. 29 process. 294 The following are a few suggestions proffered by the cynics. One of the first significant changes suggested for the NAALC process is to find ways to include the petitioners in the actual review process. 295 The "[1]ack of [t]ransparency" in the process leads to years of review without word on how the claims are being addressed; and, ultimately, once the consultation is concluded and recommendations are given, the procedure ends whether the filer believes his or her grievance has been remedied or not. 296 The closest any worker has ever come to involvement is being present at the hearing on the submission they filed, which has only happened ten times in the past thirteen years, and all of which were held for American citizens working in another country. 297 Another diminutive way workers can get involved is to attend and participate in the public forums on their submission, assuming they can afford to travel to the specified location and miss work. 298 "Given the reliance of the National Administrative Office on public submissions to highlight violations, the NAALC will only function if workers and their advocates are encouraged to participate and if mechanisms are in place to protect workers who do .... ,, 299 Additional steps should also be taken to eliminate some of the structural weaknesses inherent in the agreement as a whole. 3 00 Despite the media's ability to bring public awareness to the many issues discussed above, 3 ' "lack of political will to resolve [the] problems brought to light and refusals to use the process to its full potential nullifies the effectiveness of the NAALC. ' '30 2 Two remedies would help eliminate the structural weaknesses of the agreement. First, lowering the cost of filing a petition would ease financial tension on the migrant workers. Second, it would be beneficial to decrease the time it takes for a request to be filed, reviewed, and remedied. 3°3 If the process continues to take multiple years to reach the ministerial level, even if the process is opened up to higher review/scrutiny, the current process will only promise to take much longer.°4 If the time is shortened on each step, more claims could be processed 294 Nevertheless, if the temporal commitment is reduced, the door should be opened for utilizing all of the available avenues for review for all the Labor Principles laid out in the NAALC process. 3 0 6 After all, why should a workers' right of freedom of association, to bargain collectively, and to strike be given virtually a quarter of the available avenues of review as compared to minimum wage requirements, while the remaining five principles, including protection of migrant workers, receive just over half of the available methods? 3 0 7 Some critics have agreed, stating the tier system should be eliminated completely, 30 8 thereby lowering the burden of proof for those filing the claims, which happens to be regulated under the strictest of the three tiers. 3 0 9 Along those same lines, it has been suggested sanctions should be available for all of the Labor Principles, while simultaneously extending "complaint mechanisms and enforceable sanctions" to employers as well as the respective countries. 3 10 This is exactly the type of reform migrant workers need, especially given workers' fundamental reliance on the unions supporting their efforts for workplace protection under U.S. law. 31 ' Without sanctions or a better enforcement mechanism to bring claims, the NAALC's eleventh Labor Principle, which guaranties the right to equal protection under U.S. laws, is purely rhetoric and not for application. Without doing so, the migrant workers will continue to face the hardships the public forums and seminars are facially meant to address and theoretically discuss, but continue to fail to seriously address the real problems at hand. 31 2 Given the NAALC hands-off approach to enforcing the Labor Principles and Objectives set forth in the text of the agreement, other countries, as well as all the workers who have filed claims, are powerless to compel another country to enforce their own labor laws and standards. 313 Consequently, each respective NAO office has the unbridled authority to accept or reject a submission, which it knows may inadvertently have an affect on its interests with another country. 314 Even so, critics fall on both sides of the aisle, some think the NAALC should not have penalties at all, while others think it does not go far enough. 3 15 A few ideas have come forth regarding how to increase enforcement: (1) "a penalty for anyone offering to waive a NAALC principle to induce or retain an investment[;]" (2) "establish an arbitral disputes panel to prevent the importation into any NAALC nation of goods produced with exploitative child labor, slave or forced labor, or by unhealthy processes[;]" and (3) simply raising penalties for those countries that do not enforce their own existing labor laws. 316 This lack of enforcement capability has brought forth the idea of "harmonization." 317 Rather than each country having its own subset of labor laws and regulations, some claim there should be "an international 'floor' based on the conventions and recommendations of the tri-partite International Labor Organization.", 3 As such, a uniform set of guidelines would be established which all the three countries could, idealistically, collectively embrace and promise to uphold. 3 19 Along those same lines, some claim recognition of the ILO standards by all three countries would eliminate the need for the NAALC, because a new set of labor guarantees would be agreed upon by the three countries. 320 Those critics claim the ILO suffices because it is "a large organization with more than 1,800 employees, [and] has been working for more than 75 years to promote and monitor worker rights adoption around the world on a voluntary basis, and needs no assistance [from the NAALC] in this matter." 321 Others have attempted to offer recommendations to further protect Mexican migrant workers who could create pressure from outside the actual political course of action. For example, some have argued the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act and Fair Labor Standards Act need more specific protections for migrant workers. 32 2 There are also concerted efforts to increase the availability of the U.S. court system to migrant workers, 323 to establish more enforceable guest worker programs, and which call for a complete reform of the visa and monitoring system currently in place for migrant workers in the U.S. 324 Nevertheless, if past lack of enforcement of the NAALC is any indicator, new laws may do little to further increase migrant workers' protection.
As one stands and looks at the past thirteen years in retrospect, a unique opportunity exists to re-assess whether the goals set forth in the NAALC have been met with unparalleled achievement, capricious regret, or perhaps a little of both. Appreciatively, while over the last thirteen years critics have made their voices louder than the advocates of the agreement, it would be hasty to say it has been an absolute frustration of time and resources. 325 After all, in 1994,326 the three nations had no model to follow, no treatises to read, nor precedent on which to rely to formulate such an ambitious principle; an idea seeking to change the way one looked at how to truly protect labor forces at home and abroad. 327 It is safe then to assume at least some failures were expected. Yet, with over a decade of scrutiny, the more appropriate question has become whether these disappointments have surmounted the usefulness of the agreement.
On one hand we have seen an increase in dialogue among the three nations and an enhanced awareness to the issue of labor protection within their
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borders. Yet, on the other hand, stories of migrant farm worker mistreatment still runs rampant, 329 while reports indicate not a single submission under the NAALC has resulted in sanctions against an employer or government, reinstatement of lostjobs or wages, or reversal of job discrimination and lack of equal protection under the laws. 330 Though shortcomings are to be expected in most new endeavors, is that enough to skirt accountability and chalk the misfortunes up to naivet6, while we wait for the next chance to try again? Can we rest on our laurels, believing the resulting public awareness and media attention are good enough? The answer is certainly no to both.
As more and more Mexican migrant workers deluge the border into the U.S. in search of the jobs American employers frantically seek to fill, the pandemic of migrant worker mistreatment will maintain, if not grow more prevalent, in the coming years.
33 ' In addition, as new free trade agreements use the NAALC as a model for labor protection in other countries, it is important to make sure other countries do not purely mirror this labor agreement without evaluating first what has worked and what has not. 332 Through critical analysis and exhaustive research of the NAALC mechanism, critical mistakes can be repealed and crucial successes can be mimicked. After all, the best way to learn
